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1. Introduction 
A vast literature, based on long run projections of government expenditures and tax bases, documents 
that most industrialized countries face severe problems financing their welfare schemes as their 
populations will age profoundly after 2010. 1 Kotlikoff (2001) clarifies that assessments of the fiscal 
sustainability (FS) problem should be based on comparisons of the present values of an exhaustive set 
of government primary revenues and expenditures entering the intertemporal government budget 
defined over an infinite horizon. This method makes it impossible to camouflage the true financial 
position of governments by creative fiscal language. It gives a key role to the component specific 
growth adjusted discount rates, i.e. the differences between the interest rate on government debt and 
the growth rates of the various components in the primary budget deficit.  
 
Following this approach, this paper claims that an affirmative answer should be given to the question 
posed in the title for several economies: To be measurable in terms of present values, the FS problem 
must be diminished in several countries compared to the most plausible projections of the primary 
deficits. The following logic implications support this claim:  
1) Two fundamental requirements must be met in order to compute the present value of each 
primary budget component over an infinite horizon:  
a. The long run projections of government expenditure and revenue components must be 
consistent with steady state convergence of the economy, since alternative paths even-
tually will violate the existence conditions for equilibrium. 
b. Existence of the present value integrals requires that the relevant discount rate exceeds 
the growth rate of each and every primary budget component.  
2) Prolongation of the present policy, combined with realistic projections, imply that most ex-
penditure components will grow at rate exceeding the steady state growth rate of the economy, 
i.e. violate 1a. Nor can it be ruled out that the most plausible growth rates of at least some im-
portant expenditure components exceed the relevant discount rate, i.e. violate 1b. In both cases 
the FS problem is immeasurably large. 
                                                     
1 See Chauveau and Loufir (1995), OECD (1998, 2000, 2001), the European Commission (2001), McMorrow and Roeger 
(2002) and Visco (2002) for international comparisons of quantitative assessments of the fiscal and macroeconomic 
consequences of ageing. Kotlikoff, Smetters and Walliser (2001), Kotlikoff (2001) and Feldstein (2005) estimate the fiscal 
gap in the US, and Kotlikoff and Burns (2004) makes the gloomy US fiscal perspectives visible for a wider public. Beetsma, 
Bettendorf and Broer (2003) and The Danish Welfare Commission (2004) estimate the need for raising the tax burden in the 
Netherlands and Denmark, respectively. Andersen, Jensen and Pedersen (2004) provide a review in English of the Danish 
Welfare Commission (2004). Heide, Holmøy, Solli and Strøm (2006) finds that the future fiscal stance in Norway looks 
strikingly gloomy, especially when compared to the impressive present fiscal stance.   
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3) The practice of ad hoc reductions after some distant year of the growth in expenditure compo-
nents in order to meet conditions 1a and 1b, violates the basic assumption of prolongation of 
the present policy. It will also diminish the FS problem, possibly from an immeasurable order, 
which we want to assess as soberly as possible. The empirical importance for the FS assess-
ment is likely to be large, since the growth adjusted discount rates are small. To my knowl-
edge, these problems have not been given due attention in the FS literature. 
 
The policy implications of low effective discounting are discouraging. FS assessments based on low 
growth adjusted discount rates will necessarily be highly non-robust, even to what happens in the 
unknown remote future. Policy makers cannot be blamed for ignoring results that can take on almost 
any number by slight changes in assumptions. Specifically, marginal policy adjustments affecting 
relevant growth rates will be sufficient to restore FS.2  
 
Two possible objections should be rejected already at this stage. First, the argument above does not 
criticize the method of FS assessments based on present values as such. Rather, it implies that such 
assessments cannot be made when the lack of FS is "too large", in the sense that the growth adjusted 
discount rate is negative for at least one expenditure component. In such cases the policy response 
must make the growth rate of expenditures sustainable – any permanent level reduction will be 
insufficient. Second, the argument above should not be confused with dynamic inefficiency, which 
characterizes an economy growing at a higher rate than the interest rate. This is typically never seen in 
realistic long-term projections. However, dynamic efficiency of the aggregate economy does not 
exclude the possibility that the growth rate of specific government expenditures exceed the interest 
rate. For example, this may well be the case for government pension expenditures, given the present 
system, as a result of ageing.  
 
It follows from the argument above that the main job for this paper is to argue convincingly that 
realistic assumptions imply that the growth adjusted discount rates of at least some government 
expenditure components most likely exceed the steady state growth rate of the economy. This is done 
for the Norwegian economy by a combined use of a disaggregated dynamic Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) model and special models of government expenditures. Such a combined use of 
models takes into account the maximum available information about the forces driving the growth in 
budget components. Although some of the determinants of the growth adjusted discount rates are 
                                                     
2 Negligible discount rates makes it easy to construct paradoxical trade-offs between policy actions now and far ahead, as 
pointed out in Nordhaus’ (2006) critical comments to the Stern Review on climate changes.  
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country specific, the credo of this paper is that the detailed projections for Norway will demonstrate 
that the more fundamental problems pointed out above have general relevance for FS assessments.  
 
This paper also introduces a methodological novelty, which may have a dramatic negative effect on 
the relevant growth adjusted discount rates. In the literature the discounting of government budget 
components have been based on the pre-tax interest rate. However, this paper shows that one should 
use the after-tax interest rate, and one should correct the tax revenue collected from interest income, 
when the economy as a whole faces an intertemporal constraint on its external debt accumulation. The 
paper shows that most growth adjusted discount rates will be negative if they are based on the after-tax 
interest rate.  
 
It should be noted that there are other methods of FS assessments than the one adopted in this paper, 
which do not rely on calculations of present values over an infinite horizon. Cronin and McCoy (2000) 
claim the so-called OECD-method to be the conventional FS indicator. Drawing on Blanchard, 
Chouraqui, Hagemann and Sartor (1990), this method considers the conditions for stabilizing the ratio 
between government debt and GDP within a limited time horizon.3 The rationale for considering this 
ratio must be a positive relationship between GDP and the primary budget surplus, which can be 
motivated by the positive correlation between GDP and the tax bases. The OECD-method requires 
neither complex modelling nor much data, and it is therefore easy to employ in cross-country 
comparisons. But simplicity has a price: The method ignores behavioural and interaction effects on 
government revenues and expenditures, as well as budget effects of population ageing. Most 
importantly in relation to the present paper, the OECD-method is by construction not able to capture 
disproportionate long run growth in the different budget components. Moreover, the implicit 
autonomous proportionality between GDP and the primary budget surplus can be questioned. For 
example Andersen and Pedersen (2006a,b) and Holmøy (2006) demonstrate that productivity growth 
in the private sector may have an adverse effect on FS.  
 
Compared to the OECD-method, generational accounting takes FS assessments important steps further 
by including the fiscal effect of changes the age structure of the population, and the method bases the 
FS assessment on present value comparisons of the primary budget deficit calculated over an infinite 
time horizon.4 Thus, the problems related to low effective discounting discussed in this paper are 
equally relevant to generational accounting as to assessments based on CGE models. However, the 
                                                     
3 See e.g. Roux (1993), Hemming and Miranda (1991), Cronin and McCoy (2000) and Goldfajn (2002).  
4 Bentz and Fetzer (2004) compares the OECD-method with Generational Accounting. 
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traditional generational accounting suffers from the following shortcomings: Age profiles of taxes, 
cash transfers and government spending on individual services are assumed to stay constant, and age- 
and gender specific values of these variables are prolonged quite mechanically, typically by the 
exogenous labour productivity growth. Moreover, generational accounting ignores endogenous 
behavioural and price effects on tax bases and expenditures. In principle, properly designed CGE 
models are able to account for all the effects ignored in generational accounting, as well as other 
potentially important effects for the FS assessment. On the other hand, sufficiently detailed CGE 
models are more costly to develop, it is hard for outsiders to check the results, and complexity in terms 
of behavioural responses and interaction effects may in practice be obtained at the cost of less accurate 
description of relevant population heterogeneity, tax rules and welfare schemes. However, the latter 
criticism cannot be raised against this paper due the disaggregated approach based on the combined 
use of several models.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the empirical basis for the claim that realistic 
growth adjusted long run discount rates are low, maybe even negative. Section 3 demonstrates the 
non-robustness of FS assessments based on low effective discounting. Section 4 explains why the 
practice of exogenous steady state convergence of long run growth paths is likely to diminish the FS 
problem compared to the most realistic assessment. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Realistic growth adjusted discount rates 
2.1. Analytical framework  
The government's intertemporal budget constraint is the conceptual point of departure for FS 
assessment. It requires a comparison of the present value of government expenditures and revenues 
calculated over an infinite horizon. To make a budget constraint defined over an infinite horizon 
operational, the present value of any positive or negative specific primary budget component, Xj, is 
decomposed as follows:  
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where XPj0 is the present value of Xj, i is the nominal interest rate (assumed constant for expositional 
simplicity). t=t' is chosen so that the constant growth rate of Xj equals the constant gj for t>t'. i - gj is 
the (stationary) growth adjusted discount rate of Xj. Typically, the values for X0j,…,Xt'j and gj are found 
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from a model simulation. In this paper these variables are estimated by simulating a CGE model in 
tandem with other models through 2050. By then the relevant individual growth rates have become 
constant. I define the fiscal gap, FG0 as  
  
(2) ∑ −=
j
GPjG BXF 000 , 
where BG0 is government financial wealth at the beginning of a year 0. The sum in (2) is referred to as 
the required financial wealth in Table 3. 
2.2 The relevant discount rate 
The risk free interest rate 
The interest rate is set to 5.5 percent. This should be interpreted as a nominal risk free interest rate. 
Specifying a real interest rate may be misleading as long as a unique deflator is not defined. In FS 
assessments it is a major point that the growth rates of the price components of various tax bases, cash 
transfers and government consumption differ. Of course, the FS assessment is invariant to deflating 
the interest rate and all prices, the wage rate and specific tax rates by an arbitrary uniform inflation 
rate. The 5.5 percent nominal interest rate is well in line with the "natural" Norwegian money market 
interest rate, estimated to 5.25 percent in Bernardsen and Gerdrup (2006). Assuming a 1.5 percent 
growth in world prices measured in NOK, and an optimum mix of assets in the Government pension, 
it is also consistent with the statutory estimate of 4.0 percent real rate of return (in terms of 
international purchasing power) on this fund, which underlies the fiscal policy rule adopted in Norway 
in 2001 (explained below). Compared to observed long run nominal interest rates on bonds the 
estimate of 5.5 percent is biased upwards. In December 2006 the nominal interest rate on 30-years 
bonds were slightly above 4 percent in the US and in Germany. The interest rate on Norwegian state 
10 years bonds were 4.2 percent.  
 
A risk free interest rate is chosen although the government pension fund invests 60 percent of its 
portfolio in shares in international companies and 40 percent in foreign bonds. Including the risk 
premium in the interest rate on government assets would not affect the FS assessment, if the cost 
associated with risk were added also on the expenditure side, as it should be.  
 
The FS assessment for Denmark by Jensen, Nødgaard, Pedersen (2001) also assumes a 5.5 percent 
interest rate. Andersen and Pedersen (2006) set the nominal interest rate to 5.0 percent, but the return 
on equity is 8 percent. However, the return on equity has not been corrected for risk premium. 
Gokhale and Smetters (NBER 11060) set the real interest rate equals 3.65 percent. Their estimate on 
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the growth rate of government real expenditures is 2.8 percent, which implies an effective discount 
rate of aggregate expenditures as low as 0.85. The US Social Security Administration (2003) 
assumes a real interest rate of 3.1 percent, which is close to the rate used in the present paper for 
reasonable values of the deflator. An outlier in this context is the assumption of a 5.0 percent real 
interest rate in Beetsma, Bettendorf and Broer (2003).  
 
Should taxes be deducted in the discount rate? 
To my knowledge FS assessments base the present value calculations on the pre-tax interest rate. 
Compared to the after-tax interest rate this choice is not at all innocent when the growth adjusted 
discount rate 0 < i - gX is small. Tax rates levied on interest vary around 30 percent in most OECD 
countries. Given a nominal pre-tax interest rate of 5.5 percent, the after-tax interest rate is about 3.9 
percent. The most important component in the growth rates of both government expenditures and 
revenues is the wage rate. As will be demonstrated below, plausible estimate on future nominal wage 
growth would be about 4.0 percent. Thus, even if wage growth were the only reason to growth in 
primary budget components, the growth adjusted discount rate would be negative. However, the 
negative margin would be larger because of the expenditure effect of ageing, standard improvements 
in old-age care and maturing public pension schemes.    
 
It is not obvious whether the discount rate should be the pre- or the after-tax interest rate. A formal 
discussion is relegated to the appendix. The conclusions there can be summarized as follows:  
1. In a closed economy government financial wealth must necessarily be equal to the financial 
debt held by the private sector (households and the corporate sector). The relevant discount 
rate is then the after-tax interest rate. Moreover, taxes collected from private interest income 
should be subtracted from the primary deficit. The intuition is that a primary deficit implies an 
equally large financial investment by the private sector. Consequently, the effective interest 
payments from the government are net of the tax on private interest income. 
2. In an open economy the situation is less obvious since the government can finance a primary 
deficit by issuing debt to the foreign sector. To the extent that this is done without any effect 
on private debt, discounting of primary deficits should be based on the pre-tax interest rate. 
3. If the open economy is subject to an intertemporal national budget constraint on net foreign 
debt, there exists an intertemporal constraint on the sum of government and private net debt. 
The relevant discount rate is then the after-tax interest rate. On the other hand, government 
revenues should include tax revenues imputed on the national interest income.  
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Since the interest paid by the private sector in Norway is relatively small compared to interest income 
of the government, the calculations in this paper follow the standard practice of using the pre-tax 
interest rate when discounting government budget components. However, since this choice is crucial, 
the practice should be examined more thoroughly.   
2.3. Projecting government real expenditures5  
Demography 
The projections are based on the "middle alternative" in the official demographic projections from 
Statistics Norway (2002), which results from the most likely assumptions on deaths, births, migration 
etc.6 Longevity is assumed to increase by about 7 years over this period. The ratio of those of working 
age 20-66 to those 67 and older decreases from 4.5 in 2002 to 2.5 in 2050. The demographic 
assumptions enter the detailed dynamic micro simulation model, MOSART, which simulates the life 
courses of a cross-section of the Norwegian population.7 Specifically, MOSART captures transitions 
in and out of the labour market. The projected growth in the labour force is 11.9 percent from 2004 to 
2050, whereas the ratio between the total number of pensioners and the labour force grows from 40 to 
65 percent over this period, cf. Table 1. Maintaining the age specific transition rates from work to 
disability as observed in 2000, implies a 32 percent increase in the already large number of disability 
pensioners from 2004 to 2050.  
Table 1. Projected development in the number of pensioners, average annual benefits ex ante 
indexation and the labour force in the reference scenario. Thousand persons and 
thousand NOK, current prices 
  2004 2020 2050
Old age pensioners 639 873 1317
     Average annual benefit 116 140 146
Disability pensioners 308 388 407
     Average annual benefit 120 124 122
Widow pensioners  24 17 10
Total number of pensioners 971 1278 1734
Labour Force 2404 2564 2669
Pensioners in percent of labour force 40 50 65
 
 
                                                     
5 The projections of the government budget components are the same as those used in Heide, Holmøy, Solli and Strøm 
(2006). 
6 The most recent demographic projections, see Statistics Norway (2005) are not significantly different from the projections 
from 2002 with respect to the basic patterns of the age structure of the population. 
7 Fredriksen (1998) provides a detailed documentation of MOSART and examples of applications. The government uses the 
model regularly to compute individual pension benefits and total government pension expenditures.   
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Social security expenditures 
Social security transfers amounted to 17.9 percent of GDP in 2004. By including an accurate 
description of the pension rules, as well as a rich description of relevant population heterogeneity, 
MOSART is especially designed to compute individual pension entitlements, given individual income 
histories. Maintaining the present public pension system and the political intention of wage indexation 
of entitlements and benefits, government old-age expenditure is then projected to grow by 160 percent 
from 2004 to 2050, ex ante wage indexation of benefits. 26 percentage points of this increase can be 
attributed to maturing of the public pension system as more pensioners become entitled to 
supplementary benefits. An important force behind the remaining expenditure growth is the non-
actuarial properties of the present pension system. The annual individual old-age benefits are 
independent of the number of years as a pensioner, and thereby of the expected increase in longevity. 
Given the age specific transition rates, ageing also entails a nearly 50 percent increase in government 
disability pension expenditures ex ante wage indexation of the benefits from 2004 to 2050. 
 
Government consumption 
Government consumption amounted to 22.0 percent of GDP in 2004. Government consumption is 
divided into 1) Defence, 2) Education, 3) Health and Social Care, 4) Administration etc. The greatest 
expenditures are allocated to the provision of individual services within Education and Health and 
Social Care. Spending within each service category is decomposed into i) the price of the resources, ii) 
service standards measured by man-hours and other resources per user, iii) productivity growth, iv) the 
number of users, or the demand intensity, within different age groups, and v) the number of 
individuals in different age groups. Prolongation of present policy is interpreted as maintaining the 
service standards observed in 2004 within Education and Health and Social Care, as well as the 2004-
levels of labour input within Defence and Administration. Moreover, the 2004-proportions of capital 
and intermediaries to labour remain constant in government sectors. Labour productivity grows by 0.5 
percent annually in all government sectors, in accordance with the national accounting practice. Under 
these assumptions ageing makes it necessary to expand the employment in the Health and social care 
sector by 1-2 percent annually after 2015. In comparison total government employment grows 
annually by 0.6 percent from 2004 to 2025 and by 0.9 percent from 2026 to 2050. 
2.4. Projecting tax bases and prices of government spending 
The large scale dynamic CGE model MSG68 captures complex endogenous mechanisms in the 
determination of a relatively detailed classification of all tax bases and prices of resources used for 
                                                     
8 MSG6 is described in Heide, Holmøy, Lerskau and Solli (2004). 
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government consumption. The detailed calculations of government use of resources and social security 
expenditures ex ante indexation enter MSG6 as exogenous inputs. Iterative model simulations ensure 
approximate consistency between the MOSART assumptions on individual earnings and average real 
income growth simulated by MSG6.  
 
Prolongation of the present policy implies that all ad valorem tax rates are kept constant. Specific tax 
rates are kept constant in real terms with one exception: Until 2050 the payroll tax rate adjusts 
annually to meet the government budget constraint implied by the fiscal policy rule adopted since 
2001. After 2050 the rule is ignored: The payroll tax rate is kept constant to its 2050-level, and the 
fiscal gap is determined residually. The fiscal policy rule restricts the average annual use of the 
petroleum wealth, measured by the primary budget deficit net of the petroleum cash flow accruing to 
the government sector, to the expected real return of the assets accumulated in the government 
petroleum fund. So far the real return has been set to 4 percent.9  
 
MSG6 assumes the Norwegian economy to be too small to affect world prices and the international 
interest rate. The exchange rate is fixed. Consumers and producers are rational and equipped with 
model consistent expectations, and all agents have access to international capital markets. The 
economy as a whole obeys an intertemporal budget constraint on the accumulation of foreign debt. 
Goods and factors are perfectly mobile between industries. Supply equals demand in all markets in all 
periods. The representative consumer decides on labour supply and the composition of private 
consumption. Preference parameters are calibrated so that the uncompensated wage elasticity of total 
labour supply equals 0.1.10 Most imported products are close but imperfect substitutes for the 
corresponding domestic products. Producers allocate output between the domestic and the foreign 
market. It is costly to redirect output between these two markets, and the production functions exhibit 
decreasing returns to scale.11 Norwegian firms are price takers in the export markets and in the factor 
markets, but engage in monopolistic competition in most domestic markets.  
 
                                                     
9 The strict interpretation of the fiscal policy rule can be explained more precisely by decomposing the accumulation of 
government financial assets, B: Bt – Bt-1 = iBt-1 + Pt - Dt, where i is the international nominal interest rate, P is the cash flow 
from the petroleum sector to the government, and D is the non-petroleum primary fiscal deficit. Let π denote international 
inflation. According to the rule D = (i-π)Bt-1, which represents a constraint on D. Contingent on P, the annual growth in B 
depends purely on exogenous variables: Bt – Bt-1 = πBt-1 + Pt. As P declines, the annual consumption of the petroleum wealth 
converges to the permanent income associated with this wealth after conversion to financial assets. 
10 This choice is consistent with the results in Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm (1995). 
11 The scale elasticities range from 0.85 - 1.00. Evidence of decreasing returns to scale at the firm level is presented in Klette 
(1999). 
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Table 1 summarizes the growth picture in our baseline scenario. The GDP growth is basically driven 
by exogenous growth in total factor productivity (TFP) of 1.3 percent in private industries, which is in 
line with historical trends. Private consumption can grow faster than GDP, mainly because of 
relatively slow growth in government consumption. Petroleum revenues amounted to 41 percent of 
government revenues in 2005. The price and production forecasts of oil and gas are the same as in 
Ministry of Finance (2004). Compared to petroleum prices observed in 2006, the assumption of a real 
oil price of 25 dollars per barrel is low. However, the basic conclusions in this paper are robust to 
large changes in the oil and gas prices. Although the wage rate determination is part of the large 
simultaneous model structure, one may still say that the wage rate adjustment is the basic mechanism 
that ensures that the economy meets the intertemporal external balance constraint. The nominal growth 
in unit labour cost is 4.1 percent. This slightly exceeds the prediction of the Scandinavian Model of 
Inflation, i.e. the world price growth rate plus the growth rate of labour productivity, due to the 
petroleum wealth.12   
Table 2. Macroeconomic development in the baseline scenario. Average annual growth rates.  
Percent  
  2004-2025 2026-2050
GDP  2.0 1.6
Employment 0.3 0.1
Labour cost per hour 4.1 4.1
Consumer real wage rate  2.5 1.7
Net foreign wealth relative to GDP 6.0 0.2
Private consumption 3.0 2.1
Government consumption  0.7 1.1
 
2.5. Fiscal gap 
Table 3 shows the growth rates of the main government budget components at the end of the 
simulation period, as well as the simulated nominal values in 2050. The classification of components 
in the table is aggregated compared to the model classification, and aggregate growth rates may vary 
over time when detailed items grow at constant but different rates. The component specific growth 
adjusted discount rates are obtained by subtracting the reported long run growth rates from the 5.5 
percent nominal interest rate. Most of the resulting effective discount rates are close to 1 percent. The 
exception is the petroleum revenues, which are gradually depleted. 
                                                     
12 See Holmøy and Heide (2005) for an analysis of how decreasing returns to scale in private industries affects the 
equilibrium growth in unit labour cost compared to the Scandinavian Model of Inflation.  
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Table 3.  Main components of government revenues and expenditures based on present tax rates 
in 2050. Nominal interest rate = 0.055.  
 Nominal values in 
terms of nominal 
GDP in 2050 
Long run 
growth rates 
(gj) 
Growth 
adjusted 
discount rate  
(0.055 - gj) 
Nominal present values 
in terms of nominal 
GDP in 2050  
Non-interest revenues, 
of which 
0.526 0.0448 0.0102 50.501
    Petroleum revenues 0.013 -0.0275 0.0825 0.152
    Indirect taxes 0.127 0.0353 0.0197 6.435
    Direct taxes, excl.       
petroleum revenues 
0.386 0.0464 0.0086 44.955
Non-interest 
expenditures, of which 
0.612 0.0447 0.0103 59.639
   Pensions and 
transfers to 
households 
0.308 0.0437 0.0113 27.266
   Government 
consumption 
0.256 0.0464 0.0086 29.887
   Miscellaneous  0.048 0.0357 0.0193 2.486
Required financial 
wealth 
8.109
Accumulated financial 
wealth 
 1.015
Fiscal gap 7.082
 
Interpreted literally, Table 3 shows that the present policy is very far from being sustainable, although 
this policy would have generated a government financial net wealth of 1.015 nominal GDP by the end 
of 2050 in the base line projection. The required financial wealth in 2050 would have to be as much as 
about eight times higher in order to finance the primary deficits after 2050. In this perspective the 
Norwegian petroleum wealth is not large: In 2050 the accumulated assets in the Government 
petroleum fund plus the present value of the remaining petroleum revenues amount to slightly less 
than 2 percent of the present value of government consumption and pension expenditures.  
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3. The non-robustness of fiscal sustainability assessments 
Although the fiscal gap estimate reported in Table 3 is derived from sound principles and the 
maximum available relevant information, it is not sufficiently robust to be used face value in a final FS 
assessment of maintaining the present policy. The reason is the low growth adjusted discount rates, 
lying in the vicinity of 0.01 for the most important budget components. i - gj = 0.01 implies that the 
present value of X over an infinite horizon is 100X. The sensitivity can be illustrated by some striking 
examples. Raising the growth rate of non-interest government revenues from 0.0448 to 0.050 would, 
cet. par, increase the present value of the revenues after 2050 by 108.2 percent (from 410 409 to 854 
520 billions NOK). The fiscal gap in terms of nominal GDP in 2050 would turn from a deficit of 7.1 to 
a surplus of 105.1. As another example, assume that the reported growth rates are approximations 
based on 4 decimals, and that the "true" stationary growth rates of non-interest revenues and 
expenditures are, respectively, 0.04484 (instead of 0.04480) and 0.04465 (instead of 0.04470). Then 
the fiscal gap in 2050 is reduced by 14 billions NOK.  
 
The growth in the most important expenditure components, such as public pensions and care for the 
elderly, is determined by demographic trends and the welfare schemes. Thus, i < gj is not a theoretical 
curiosity, even if the economy is dynamically efficient. As pointed out above, most growth adjusted 
discount rates would be negative if the discounting were based on the after-tax interest rate. The 
nominal pre-tax interest rate of 0.055 and the Norwegian tax rate on interest income of 0.28 implies an 
after-tax interest equal to 0.0396, which is lower than the growth rates of most nominal primary 
budget components. 
 
The small growth adjusted discount rate implies large effects of reducing the interest rate. As an 
illustration, consider the effects of reducing it from 5.5 to 5.0 percent. This reduces the government 
financial wealth accumulated by the end of 2050 by 6.8 percent compared to the reference path. 
However, a much stronger deterioration of the fiscal stance comes from lower discounting of future 
budget deficits. Whereas the present value computed in 2050 of non-interest revenues increases by 94 
percent, the corresponding increase in non-interest expenditures is 121.4 percent. Most of the latter 
increase is due to a huge increase in the present value of the government wage bill, which grows at a 
stationary rate of 4.71 percent. Reducing the interest rate by 0.5 points raises the present value of 1 
(dollar) over an infinite horizon from 126.6 to 344.8, i.e. by 172 percent! Compared to the effect of 
weaker discounting, the positive equilibrium effects on the tax bases are almost negligible.  
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As a less technical example of non-robustness, consider using the average growth rate for government 
consumption expenditures in the computation of the corresponding present value, rather than adding 
the present values of the different components of government consumption. In 2050 the aggregate 
government consumption expenditure has reached a growth rate of 4.27 percent. In terms of nominal 
GDP in 2050 the corresponding present value in 2050 becomes 20.8 (169 244 billions NOK), which is 
9.1 (73 638 billions) less than the "correct" estimate! This aggregation error is mainly a consequence 
of the government wage bill – by far the largest government consumption component - growing 
significantly faster in the long run than other components (4.99 percent). The true average growth rate 
is therefore not stationary in 2050 and onwards, but increases as the weight of wage costs grows. 
4. Steady state convergence diminishes the FS problem 
The previous section demonstrates that reliable FS estimates require very detailed models of 
government revenues and expenditures, since low effective discount rates make it important to account 
for differences in the long run growth rates of budget components. Even the quite detailed 
classification in our model framework can be criticised for being too crude. The most important over-
simplification is probably the description of man-hours as homogenous with a common wage rate. FS 
assessments for Norway are particularly sensitive to aggregation errors due to the importance of the 
non-renewable petroleum resources. The projected petroleum revenues fall at an annual rate of 2.75 
percent after 2050, whereas pensions and other transfers to households grow by 4.34 percent per year. 
Non-uniform growth is also the case for cash transfers to households, since some of these are indexed 
to the consumer price index rather than the wage rate. For the same reason the revenue from indirect 
taxes grows significantly slower than the revenue from direct taxes. 
 
Thus, the practice of imposing assumptions which imply convergence towards a steady state growth 
path, defined as stationary relative prices and a uniform growth rate of all real variables, would 
overrule aspects of reality and yield highly misleading results. The conditions for steady state 
convergence are highly unrealistic, including e.g. homothetic preferences, uniform labour augmenting 
productivity growth in all sectors and uniform growth in all world prices. Specifically, the growth 
trends of government consumption and welfare transfers results from policy, and steady state 
convergence would violate the fundamental premise of FS assessments that the present policy is 
maintained. For example, enforcing steady state convergence from above of public pension 
expenditures implicitly presupposes cost saving pension reforms or a more favourable demographic 
development. However, growth paths without steady state convergence cannot be sustained over an 
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infinite horizon, since the fastest growing sector eventually absorb the whole economy. Such paths 
have entered the unrealistic domain long before they violate mathematical existence conditions.  
 
The practical solution is to impose ad hoc steady state convergence of the economy, including the 
growth in government expenditure components, after a “sufficiently distant” year. With “normal” 
discounting such a practice typically has a minor quantitative effect on the growth path in the nearest 
decades and the FS assessment. But this is not the case when the effective discount rates are as low as 
about 1 percent. Both the assumptions determining the steady state growth rate, as well as the timing 
of the exogenous steady state convergence may have significant impact on present values of budget 
components. In economies facing problems of fiscal sustainability if the present policy is prolonged, 
several government expenditure components are likely to grow faster than the plausible steady state 
growth of the total economy. In this case the exogenous adjustments of welfare schemes and 
demographic trends that ensure general steady state convergence will reduce the present value of the 
government primary deficit. The improvement of the fiscal stance will be greater the earlier in the 
projection these adjustments start. However, without steady state convergence the lack of FS is 
immeasurably large. This justifies the title of this paper: In order to be measured the FS problem must 
be diminished.  
5. Conclusions 
The correct method of assessing the FS of the present fiscal policy is to compare present values over 
an infinite horizon of an exhaustive set of primary government budget component. The method 
requires 1) steady state convergence of the economy, including all government primary budget 
components, and 2) the resulting unique steady state growth adjusted discount rate must be positive. 
Taking the rich welfare state Norway as an example, this paper has demonstrated that the most 
realistic projections of the growth in government expenditures may well be more rapid than the growth 
of the economy as a result of population ageing and generous welfare schemes. Even if the economy is 
dynamically efficient, it is not unlikely that the long run growth rates of important expenditure 
components also exceed the discount rate used to calculate the present values of the budget 
components. Such a situation is much more likely when the economy as a whole faces a constraint on 
the accumulation of foreign debt, since the relevant discount rate then is the after-tax interest rate. 
When the long run growth rate in at least one expenditure component exceeds the steady state growth 
rate of the rest of the economy and/or the relevant discount rate, the lack of FS is immeasurably large. 
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Ad hoc exogenous enforcement of steady state convergence of all government expenditures and other 
primary budget components from an arbitrary distant year diminishes the FS problem to be within a 
measurable range. This common practice violates the basic FS assumption of maintaining the present 
policy. With “normal” discount rates, such an overruling of the most plausible expenditure projections 
can be justified, because it has a negligible impact on present values as long as it sets in after a 
sufficiently distant year. But low growth adjusted discount rates implies that both the timing of the 
steady state convergence, as well as the determinants of the steady state growth rate, will have a large 
empirical effect on the FS assessment.  
 
It will not be fair to blame policy makers for ignoring FS estimates based on small growth adjusted 
discount rates of government expenditures, since they will be highly non-robust to exogenous 
assumptions and events in a very remote unknown future. Apparently "innocent" changes in model 
design, aggregation and computational errors will be greatly magnified. These deceptive conclusions 
do not imply any kind of criticism of the present value based method of FS assessment. The 
conclusions are important just because this method is the correct one. Low long run growth adjusted 
interest rates are not likely to be a peculiarity of Norway, although the figures reported in this paper 
probably are most representative for countries with a large labour intensive government production 
sectors and non-actuarial public pension systems with wage indexation of benefits.  
 
A constructive way of looking at the problem of immeasurable lack of FS or highly non-robust FS 
estimates is to pay more attention to policy reforms which affect the growth rates of government 
expenditures, rather than shifts in expenditure levels. FS estimates have typically been translated into 
the once-and-for-all increase (decrease) in the level of one or several tax rates (cash transfers or 
spending components). Low or negative growth adjusted discount rates of government expenditures 
indicate that restoring FS requires a reduction of the growth rate of the exploding expenditure 
components. Such policy actions have already been taken. Good examples are the public pension 
reforms implemented in Sweden and proposed in Norway, in which an automatic mechanism 
neutralizes the effect of increased longevity on the average present value of public pension benefits.  
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Appendix 
Should discounting be based on the pre- or after-tax interest rate? 
The accumulation of private and government financial wealth is given by the differential equations 
 
1) ( ) PPP SBiB +−= τ1& , 
 
2) PGGG iBSiBB τ++=& , 
 
where PB&  and GB&  are the time derivatives of, respectively, private wealth, BP, and government wealth 
BG. i is the pre-tax interest rate, τ  is the tax rate on interest income, both assumed to be constant. SP  is 
private savings, and SG is the primary budget surplus net of the tax revenue collected on private 
interest income. Define the after-tax interest rate ( )τ−= 1iiN . Without loosing the main points, 
savings in both sectors are assumed to grow at constant rates. The solution of (1) then becomes 
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Inserting (3) the solution of (2) can be written 
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Except for the tax revenue collected from private interest income, no restrictions have been imposed 
that implies inter-dependency between BP and BG. The Non-Ponzi-Game (NPG) condition associated 
with BG is 
 
5) ( ) 0lim =−
∞→
it
Gt etB .  
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Inserting (4) it takes the form 
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We shall henceforth assume that NP ig <  and NO ig < . The expression then simplifies to 
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The fiscal gap is defined as  
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Thus, without any further restrictions the discounting of all relevant flow variables should be based on 
the pre-tax interest rate when calculating the fiscal gap. This corresponds to the situation of an 
economy in which both the government and the private sector have unlimited access to the 
international capital market.   
 
If we impose the NPG-condition on private wealth, i.e. ( ) ( ) 000lim PNPPtiPt SigBetB N =−⇔=−∞→ , 
the fiscal gap expression simplifies to 
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but the discounting of all relevant flow variables should still be based on the pre-tax interest rate. 
 
Special case 1: No international capital movements 
In this case we must have 0=+ GP BB . The government cannot issue debt to any other sector than the 
rest of the economy, i.e. the private sector. The accumulation of government wealth then becomes 
GGNG SBiB +=& , which implies 
23 
9) ( ) ( )( )⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−=
− 100
tig
GN
G
G
ti
G
NGN e
gi
SBetB . 
 
The Non-Ponzi-Game (NPG) condition associated with BG now takes the form  
 
10) ( ) .0lim 00 =⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
+=−
∞→
GN
G
G
ti
Gt gi
SBetB N  
 
The fiscal gap becomes  
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Three conclusions can be drawn in this case: 
1. Future primary budget surpluses should be discounted with the after-tax interest rate when 
calculating the fiscal gap.  
2. The relevant definition of the primary budget surplus excludes taxes collected on private inter-
est income. 
3. Provided that 0>GB , both point 1 and 2 makes the government budget constraint stricter 
compared to an analysis which ignores the tax rate on interest income. 
 
 
Special case 2: Foreign debt constrained by a national budget constraint  
In this case the government and the private sector have access to the international capital market, but 
the foreign sector behaves as one institutional sector with an intertemporal budget constraint. By 
definition, the financial wealth of the foreign by definition corresponds to the national foreign debt of 
the “home” economy we consider. Consequently, the government sector cannot accumulate debt 
independent of the debt accumulation in the private sector (and vice versa). 
 
Define national financial wealth as PGN BBB += . It grows according to 
 
12) ( ) NNPGGPPPGN SiBiBSiBSBiBBB +=++++−=+= ττ1&&&  
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where GPN SSS +≡ . The relevant interest rate for discounting government budget components will 
be independent of the time paths for SN. For expositional transparency, it is therefore assumed that 
( ) tgNN NeStS 0= , where gN < i. The solution for BN can then be written 
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The NPG-condition imposed on BN implies ( )
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NPG-condition, the wealth accumulation degenerates to  
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Substituting GNP BBB −= into (2) yields  
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Since the after-tax interest rate is the coefficient associated with BG, it follows directly that the relevant 
discount rate when calculating the fiscal gap. The solution now becomes 
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The fiscal gap formula becomes  
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Two conclusions can be drawn from (17): 
1. In the case of a national intertemporal constraint on the sum of government and private finan-
cial wealth, discounting of all government expenditures and revenues should be based on the 
after-tax interest rate. Compared to fiscal gap estimates based on the pre-tax interest rate, the 
effect in the first point makes the government budget constraint, 00 =GF , stricter, provided 
that BG0 > 0. 
2. On the other hand, revenues should include a capital tax revenue imputed on the national in-
terest income.  
